Virtue Ethics and Moral Life

Is virtue ethics today still capable of providing a relevant contribution to moral-philosophical research and reflection? The answer to this question seems to be affirmative, at least if one considers the breadth and richness of the debate that has developed on the issue of the virtues in recent decades. There are many reasons that might justify a sort of rediscovery and renewal of interest in virtue paradigm. In the first place, virtue ethics has to do with taking on a first person perspective – strongly undervalued and even overlooked by many scholars in contemporary moral-philosophical studies – which distinguishes itself by being a strictly normative inquiry, based on a third person perspective. Virtue ethics more than focusing on single acts and the norms that govern them invites the subject to observe above all the integrity of one’s own moral life so as to then be able to pursue those questions most expressly normative and applicable and do so in the most appropriate manner.