Robust Localization for Secure Navigation of UAV Formations Under GNSS Spoofing Attack

Nowadays, aerial formations are frequently employed in outdoor scenarios to cooperatively explore and monitor wide areas of interest. In these applications, the vehicles are often exposed to relevant security vulnerabilities, as, for instance, the alteration of navigation signals from an attacker with map counterfeiting (if not even hijacking) purposes. In this work, we focus on an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) formation that monitors an area, wherein navigation spoofing attacks may occur. Letting the UAVs cooperate and exploiting the redundancy in the available sensing information, a distributed procedure is proposed to i) detect spoofing attacks, and ii) support the navigation in adverse conditions. The validity of the designed approach is confirmed by numerical results. Aerial vehicles for outdoor operation are generally endowed with inertial measurements, relative ranging, and GNSS sensing capability. In this work, two cascaded estimation algorithms for concurrent GNSS spoofing detection and localization in a multi-UAV scenario is proposed, to attain robust navigation in areas subject to GNSS spoofing attacks. The attack detection leverages on information theoretic tools to provide a practical threshold test by checking the multimodal measurement consistency. The localization procedures exploit a decision logic relying on measurement reliability to combine information sources that are different in nature, for UAV self-localization in both safe and under-attack conditions. Note to Practitioners-Aerial vehicles for outdoor operation are generally endowed with inertial measurements, relative ranging, and GNSS sensing capability. In this work, two cascaded estimation algorithms for concurrent GNSS spoofing detection and localization in a multi-UAV scenario is proposed, to attain robust navigation in areas subject to GNSS spoofing attacks. The attack detection leverages on information theoretic tools to provide a practical threshold test by checking the multimodal measurement consistency. The localization procedures exploit a decision logic relying on measurement reliability to combine information sources that are different in nature, for UAV self-localization in both safe and under-attack conditions.